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Shared	Island?	There’s	hope	for	British-Irish
intergovernmental	relations
Brexit	revealed	the	weaknesses	in	British-Irish	intergovernmental	relations	and	also	created	a	need	for	the	Irish
government	to	provide	a	clearer	policy	to	Northern	Ireland,	given	the	economic	implications	of	Brexit	and	calls	for
unification,	argues	Etain	Tannam	(Trinity	College	Dublin).	Time	will	tell	whether	the	Shared	Island	document	marks
a	new	beginning	or	a	false	dawn,	but	it	is	most	certainly	a	landmark	and	heralds	an	optimistic	start.
The	Irish	government’s	successful	lobbying	for	the	inclusion	of	the	Northern	Ireland	protocol	in	the	EU-UK
Withdrawal	Agreement	led	to	tensions	between	the	DUP	and	the	Irish	government,	whereby	it	was	blamed	for	its
emphasis	on	protecting	a	soft	border.	However,	the	new	Taoiseach,	Micheál	Martin	appears	to	have	got	off	to	a
good	start	with	unionists	in	Northern	Ireland,	unlike	his	predecessor	Leo	Varadkar,	who	was	regarded	by	unionists
as	favouring	nationalists.	Martin’s	stark	condemnation	of	Sinn	Féin	in	February	2020	contributed	to	the	unionist
welcome	(though	Leo	Vardakar	had	also	made	stark	statements).
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The	new	coalition	government’s	‘Shared	Island’	section	in	the	Programme	for	Government	proposes	a	plan	for
policy	to	Northern	Ireland	that	has	not	been	criticised	by	unionists	and	that	is	noteworthy	in	3	main	ways:	i.	It
provides	a	more	explicit	and	long-term	approach	to	Northern	Ireland	and	to	the	British-Irish	relationship,	ii.	It	alters
policy	emphasis	in	some	ways	that	shows	increased	sensitivity	to	unionist	perspectives.	iii.	The	final	version	in	June
differed	quite	significantly	from	the	draft	version	in	April.
As	regards	an	explicit	plan,	the	UK	and	Irish	governments’	approach	has	tended	to	be	one	of	ad	hoc	crisis
management	since	2007.	The	former	Secretary	of	State,	Julian	Smith	and	the	Irish	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs,
Simon	Coveney	were	commended	for	their	involvement	in	the	restoration	of	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive,	but	the
success	of	the	peace	process,	the	burden	of	dealing	with	austerity	in	Ireland	from	2008	to	2013,	the	Brexit
negotiations		and	lacklustre	engagement	from	UK		governments	made	a	clear	plan	difficult	to	formulate.		The	2020
Programme	for	Government	provides	a	detailed	long-term	plan	and	creates	a	new	unit	in	the	Department	of	the
Taoiseach	to	‘work	towards	a	consensus	on	a	shared	island’.	It	seeks	to	energise	the	North-South	Ministerial
Council	(strand	2	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement),	as	well	as	the	British-Irish	Intergovernmental	Conference	(BIIGC)
and	the	British-Irish	Council	(BIC)	(Strand	3	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement).	It	also	seeks	to	‘expand	and
develop’	mechanisms	for	engagement	between	the	Irish	parliament,	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly,	the	UK
parliament	and	the	devolved	assemblies	in	Scotland	and	Wales.	It	pledges	to	prioritise	regular	bilateral
engagements	between	both	governments	across	all	sectors	and	to	deepen	relations	with	devolved	governments	in
Wales	and	Scotland.	In	short,	the	new	programme	for	government	provides	a	detailed	plan	that	guides	policy	in	the
context	of	UK’s	departure	from	the	EU	for	the	next	4	years,	if	not	longer.
The	second	reason	the	programme	is	noteworthy	is	its	sensitivity	to	unionist	concerns.	Unionists	have	tended	to
perceive	that	Irish	governments	facilitate	nationalist	aims	and	that	the	BIIGC	increases	Irish	interference	in	Northern
Ireland.	UK	governments	also	have	tended	to	downplay	the	BIIGC	and	have	posited	bilateral	frameworks	outside
the	Good	Friday	Agreement	to	deal	with	the	post-Brexit	period.	Therefore,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	Shared	Island
document	and	the	new	unit	in	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	do	not	refer	to	a	united	Ireland.	The	document
frequently	refers	to	the	aim	of	building	consensus	for	a	shared	island.	In	addition,	the	document,	although	it
mentions	the	BIIGC	and	envisages	a	fuller	use	of	that	institution,	does	so	towards	the	end	and	it	does	so	alongside
new	bilateral	frameworks	outside	the	Good	Friday	Agreement.	It	also	frequently	refers	to	working	with	the	Northern
Ireland	Executive	and	the	UK	government,	presumably	to	reassure	unionists	that	it	will	not	go	over	the	heads	of	the
Executive.	It	is	also	striking	that	the	above	features	were	emphasised	more	strongly	in	the	final	draft	than	in	the
April	draft.
The	draft	document	stated	that	the	new	unit	in	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	seeks	to	build	a	‘united’	island.	The
final	document	states	that	it	seeks	to	build	a	‘shared’	island.	Thus,	the	document	deliberately	separates
reconciliation	and	pragmatic	cooperation	from	a	united	Ireland.	By	so	doing,	contrary	to	some	nationalist	criticism	of
the	1st	draft	that	it	aimed	to	achieve	unification	by	parallel	consent	of	both	communities,	it	does	not	undermine	the
Good	Friday	Agreement’s	stipulation	that	unification	must	occur	if	a	majority	of	the	Northern	Ireland	electorate
(51%)	support	it.		It	deals	with	reconciliation	and	cooperation,	not	unification	and	echoes	the	spirit	and	letter	of	the
Good	Friday	Agreement.	Another	difference	is	that	there	is	a	stronger	emphasis	on	the	BIIGC	and	the	BIC	in	the
draft	document,	whereby	they	are	mentioned	earlier	on	and	where	there	is	no	mention	of	other	bilateral	frameworks,
or	relations	with	Wales	and	Scotland.	Also,	in	the	draft	document,	the	aim	of	‘expanding’	the	BIIGC	and	the	BIC	was
stated,	but	in	the	final	document,	the	aim	is	to	‘enhance’	their	role	–	a	less	threatening	term	to	unionists.	Finally,
there	is	no	mention	of	working	with	the	Executive	in	the	draft	document,	whereas	there	are	many	references	in	the
final	document,	implying	that	the	Irish	government	will	not	go	over	the	heads	of	the	DUP	or	other	parties.
Overall,	the	Shared	Island	mission	marks	a	not	insignificant	landmark	in	Irish	policy	in	recent	times.	It	sets	out
clearly	the	aim	of	building	reconciliation	on	the	island	through	consensual	politics.	By	providing	a	clear	policy	it
seeks	to	create	more	security	for	unionists.	By	including	bilateral	frameworks	outside	the	BIIGC,	though	seeking	to
enhance	the	BIIGC	too,	it	should	also	satisfy	the	UK	government’s	preferences.	The	key	question	is	whether	the
UK	government	will	engage	in	plans	for	stronger	and	more	regular	bilateral	meetings	and	to	what	extent	it	was
informally	consulted	about	the	plans.	It		is	likely	that	after	UK-EU	trade	negotiations	are	concluded,	UK	engagement
will	develop,	particularly	when	there	is	a	new	government	in	Westminster	and	given	the	existence	of	intense
lobbying	by	Irish	officials.
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It	is	still	uncertain	whether	unionist	expectations	of	Micheál	Martin	and	the	new	government	will	be	met.	There	will
undoubtedly	be	conflicts	and	sensitivities	and	the	period	from	2008	to	2011	when	Martin	was	Minister	for	Foreign
Affairs	lacked	any	of	the	tensions	unleashed	by	Brexit.	Simon	Coveney,	praised	by	many	for	his	dedication,	was
another	thorn	in	the	side	for	some	unionists	(mainly	because	of	the	Protocol)	and	is	still	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs,
though	it	is	likely	that	Micheál	Martin	will	play	a	more	central	role	than	his	predecesor.	As	the	UK’s	departure	from
the	EU	embeds,	time	will	tell	whether	the	Shared	Island	document	marks	a	new	beginning	or	a	false	dawn,	but	it	is
most	certainly	a	landmark	and	heralds	an	optimistic	start	for	British-Irish	and	cross-border	relations.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	Image	by	William
Murphy,	Some	rights	reserved.
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